

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----051438 251844Z /43  
O 251726Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2996

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 HELSINKI 2386

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PCAT, PARM, US, UR  
SUBJ: US-SOVIET CAT III: JULY 25TH PLENARY

1. THE THIRD PLENARY OF CAT ROUND III WAS DEVOTED TO THE REGIONAL APPROACH. MENDELEVICH LED OFF WITH A POSITIVE STATEMENT ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REGIONAL APPROACH IN WHAT EVER AGREEMENTS WE MIGHT REACH. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE COULD NOT REACH "FINAL" AGREEMENT ON REGIONAL RESTRAINT BEFORE THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON CRITERIA. BUT HE SAID THEY ACCEPTED THE POSSIBILITY OF COMING TO AGREEMENT ON INTERIM MEASURES PROPOSED "SEPARATE FROM" CURRENT WORK ON CRITERIA. HE POSED SEVERAL QUESTIONS FOR THE REGIONAL WORKING GROUP TO CONSIDER:

- ON WHAT BASIS SHOULD REGIONS OR SUB-REGIONS BE DEFINED FOR THE PURPOSE OF RESTRAINT;
- HOW DO WE AVOID OR DEAL WITH THE INEVITABLE PERCEPTIONS OF PATERNALISM THAT WILL BE CREATED BY OUR REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS;
- HOW SHOULD WE DEAL WITH LOCAL INITIATIVES IN ORDER TO SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE THEM;
- HOW SHOULD WE DEAL WITH THE VARIOUS MINI-BLOCKS THAT ARE BEING CONTEMPLATED IN SOME REGIONS;
- WHAT FORM SHOULD CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS TAKE.

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2. GELB THEN PRESENTED THE BASIS FOR THE REGIONAL APPROACH, AND ARGUED THAT WE SHOULD BE SEEKING SEPARATE INTERIM AGREEMENTS EVEN AS WE WORK ON OVERALL AGREEMENT ON CRITERIA, IN ORDER NOT TO MISS OPPORTUNITIES THAT EXIST NOW TO SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE REGIONAL INITIATIVES. HE CITED A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS THE SOVIET SIDE SEEMS TO BE HAVING WITH THE IDEA OF INTERIM MEASURES AND EX-

PLAINED WHY THEY SHOULD NOT BE PROBLEMS. HE WECOMED MENDELEVICH'S PROPOSALS FOR WHAT THE REGIONAL WORKING GROUP SHOULD BE CONSIDERING IN THE NEXT ROUND, AND THEY REPEATED THE US PROPOSALS FOR SPECIFIC INTERIM STEPS WITH REGARD TO LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA, BEGINNING SOUTH OF THE SAHARA.

3. MENDELEVICH REPLIED THAT IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT GELB WAS NOW SAYING THAT THE OVERALL SOLUTION COULD BE REDUCED TO A NUMBER OF INTERIM AGREEMENTS AND DEFERRED INDEFINITELY. GELB EMPHASIZED THAT WE DO NOT SEEK INTERIM AGREEMENTS TO PUT OFF OVERALL AGREEMENT; WE ARE PREPARED NOW TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON CRITERIA, AND WE PURSUE INTERIM AGREEMENTS IN ORDER TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF EXISTING OPPORTUNITIES. HE THEN REPEATED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE SEEMED TO BE MAKING A PROCEDURAL FETISH OF THE NEED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON OVERALL CRITERIA BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE COULD BE AGREED. MENDELEVICH SEEMED TO BACK DOWN AND AGREE. HE THEN ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. WOULD DISCUSS REGIONAL PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY THE SOVIET SIDE, AND GELB REPLIED THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY REGIONS, BUT BELIEVED THAT IT WAS IN MUTUAL INTEREST TO BEGIN WITH LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA BEGINNING SOUTH OF THE SAHARA.

4. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF GELB'S FORMAL STATEMENT:  
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--WHERE AND HOW REGIONAL APPROACH FITS INTO OVERALL THREE-PART FRAMEWORK.  
--LEGAL/POLITICAL CRITERIA WILL DETERMINE WHETHER AND, TO A LIMITED EXTENT, HOW WE MAKE TRANSFERS.  
--MILITARY/TEHCNICAL CRITERIA WILL BEGIN TO SET BOUNDARIES ON WHAT TYPES OF TRANSFERS AND IN WHAT AMOUNTS.  
--REGIONAL APPROACH IS NECESSARY TO SEE WHAT IMPACT CRITERIA WILL HAVE WHEN APPLIED TO CONCRETE SITUATIONS.  
--WHEN WE PUT ALL THREE ELEMENTS TOGETHER WE HAVE A PICTURE OF HOW WE BOTH MAKE TRANSFER DECISIONS AND A COMMON BASIS FOR REALISTIC DISCUSSIONS. THIS WILL LEAD TO A GENERAL, OVERALL RESTRAINT REGIME.  
--REGIONAL WORKING GROUP ALSO SERVES A SECOND PURPOSE; TO CONSIDER INTERIM OR PRELIMINARY RESTRAINT EFFORTS.  
--FOR INTERIM, WE PROPOSE CERTAIN MEASURES IN LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA FOR REASONS OF OPPORTUNITY, AVOIDING US-SOVIET COMPETITION, AND BECAUSE OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS ARE LESS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THESE AREAS THAN IN OTHERS.  
--SOVIET SAID SEEMS TO HAVE PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING THESE INTERIM RESTRAINT REGIMES, BUT NOT IN DISCUSSING

THEM.

--FIRST PROBLEM IS INSISTING THAT CRITERIA MUST BE  
AGREED UPON BEFOREHAND. THIS SEEMS TO BE AN  
ABSTRACT PROCEDURAL POINT, POSSIBLY A DELAYING  
TACTIC.

--SECOND PROBLEM CONCERNS HOW RESTRAINT WOULD  
AFFECT PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REVO-  
LUTION. WE DON'T EXPECT YOU TO ABANDON POLITICAL  
OBJECTIVES, BUT YOU PROFESS TO SUPPORT PEACEFUL  
CHANGE. YOUR RELUCTANCE TO TAKE INTERIM MEASURES  
THAT WOULD SUPPORT PEACEFUL CHANGE RAISES QUESTIONS  
ABOUT YOUR SINCERITY.

--SPECIFIC PROBLEM WITH AYACUCHO SEEMS TO BE  
INVOLVEMENT OF A PARTICULAR COUNTRY, BUT YOU HAVE  
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ALREADY ENDORSED THIS INITIATIVE IN THE SSOD.

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-----051769 251902Z /43

O 251726Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2997

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 HELSINKI 2386

EXDIS

--SPECIFIC PROBLEM WITH AFRICA SEEMS TO BE THAT  
YOU DON'T WANT TO REMOVE THE THREAT OF SOVIET OR  
CUBAN INVOLVMENT IN REVOLUTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.  
AGAIN IT IS A QUESTION OF SUPPORTING PEACEFUL  
CHANGE, WHICH OUR INTERIM PROPOSALS DO. NEITHER  
SIDE IS REQUIRED TO ABANDON ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES.  
--NEXT STEPS FOR REGIONAL WORKING GROUP.  
--CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS OF CRITERIA APPLICATIONS FOR  
OVERALL FRAMEWORK.

--CONSIDER INTERIM PROPOSALS: FOR LATIN AMERICA, PUBLIC INDICATION OF SUPPORT FOR AYACUCHO SIGNATURES AND THE MEXICAN INITIATIVE COUNTRIES; AND ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM SUPPLIER RESTRAINT REGIME, INCLUDING CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM, TO SUPPORT LATIN AMERICAN SELF-RESTRAINT. FOR AFRICA, AGREE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF A DEMARCHE TO AFRICAN STATES, ENCOURAGING SELF-RESTRAINT; AGREE ON PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR PRINCIPLE OF ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINT IN AFRICA, BEGINNING SOUTH OF THE SAHARA; AND ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM SUPPLIER RESTRAINT REGIME.

--THE PROCEDURAL STEPS TO IMPLEMENT THESE PROPOSALS ARE EASY. AGREE TO COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE AND AGREE IN PRINCIPLE ON AFRICAN DEMARCHE WITH DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

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--ON SUBSTANCE, THERE ARE TWO ALTERNATIVES: AAFOCUS ON INTERIM APPLICATION OF CERTAIN CRITERIA AND ESTABLISH A CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM TO IMPLEMENT THEM.

--IF YOU FEEL IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO APPLY ANY CRITERIA AS SUCH, THEN LET'S SIMPLY AGREE ON AN INTERIM BASIS NOT TO TRANSFER CERTAIN WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND CERTAIN AMOUNTS OF WEAPONS.

--WE BELIEVE EITHER IS SATISFACTORY AS AN INTERIM REGIME.

--THESE STEPS CAN AND SHOULD BE DISCUSSED. WE AGREED IN LAST ROUND THAT THERE WOULD BE OCCASIONS WHEN BILATERAL RESTRAINT WOULD MAKE MUTUAL SENSE, EVEN IN ABSENCE OF WIDER REGIME. THE STEPS WE SUGGEST TAKING, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, ARE PROCEDURAL, SHOULD NOT REQUIRE NEW POLICY DECISIONS, AND FLOW NATURALLY FROM THE SSOD.

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